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Epistemic severing and epistemic trademarking. 








In this paper, I identify two inter-related varieties of epistemic injustice ubiquitous in science. 
Epistemic severing is the act of cutting off some epistemic communities from the narrative of 
scientific knowledge production. Epistemic trademarking is the ensuing process of trademarking 
relevant portions of scientific knowledge as the exclusive product of one epistemic community 
over others. I elucidate the nature of these two notions with examples from the history of physics 
and contemporary biopiracy.  
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1. Two garden varieties of epistemic injustices in science 
 
The multifaceted landscape of epistemic injustice in science has attracted growing attention among 
philosophers of science. In this paper, I lay out the contours of two garden varieties of epistemic 
injustice in science: what I call epistemic severing and epistemic trademarking. These both originate from 
a common and much-treasured feature of scientific knowledge: its being an “epistemic good” that 
can travel, be shared, expanded upon, and traded for. 
In societies where the socio-economic levers of power are unequally distributed, or across 
situated scientific perspectives whose historical “interlacing” has been exploitative in nature (see 
Massimi 2022), this otherwise treasured feature of scientific knowledge opens the door to the risk 
of specific epistemic injustices. Their origin can be identified in broader and well-studied 
mechanisms of epistemic exclusion affecting marginalized groups in what Kristie Dotson (2014) 
has called “epistemic oppression” and Emmalon Davis (2018) has characterized as “epistemic 
appropriation.”  
Davis, for example, sees epistemic appropriation as a twofold epistemic injustice involving 
what she calls epistemic detachment, whereby the “epistemic resources developed within the margins 
gain intercommunal uptake, those resources are overtly detached from the marginalized knowers 
responsible for their production,” and epistemic misdirection, “when epistemic resources developed 
within, but detached from, the margins are utilized in dominant discourses in ways that 
disproportionately benefit the powerful” (Davis 2018, p. 705)—concepts that she illustrates with  
examples from gender and race.  
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One fundamental feature typical of epistemic injustices more generally is the failure “to 
identify a speaker as a knower” and the inability of the audience to “discern the possession of 
credibility” by the speaker (Dotson 2011, p. 242). In some contexts, however, marginalized groups 
are harmed not so much by the perceived lack of credibility of their speakers, but, if anything, by 
the “credibility excess” of the dominant group’ (Davis 2016). 
There are two related garden varieties of epistemic injustices that affect a particular kind of 
knowledge—scientific knowledge—and that so far have received much less attention in 
philosophy of science. They have, however, often been discussed in postcolonial science studies, 
although no philosophical analysis of them has been offered to date. My aim here is to articulate 
the underlying epistemic mechanism behind these two varieties of epistemic injustices in science.  
Their domain is not so much testimonial justice or hermeneutical justice (see Fricker 1999, 
2007), but instead what is referred to as “informational justice”: namely the broad framework that 
focuses on “equitable inclusion of people, groups, and communities as they themselves are sources 
of information, and they actively contribute to, seek, process, and analyse information” (Atkins 
and Mahmud 2021, p. 1). Much of the current work in this field concerns information and 
communication technology (ICT), with a focus on notions such as “information poverty” and 
“information inequities” in the way in which particular data are collected, analyzed, and used by 
various social groups (see, e.g., Eubanks 2011).  
However, there is an additional and no less important aspect of informational justice that 
concerns not so much access to data and information already available, but instead the very production 
of scientific knowledge qua information—in the forms of data, inferred phenomena, modeling practices 
to elicit them, experimental tools, and so forth—and how that information gets passed on, shared, 
and traded from one epistemic community to another in the seamless process of knowledge 
production. By virtue of being an “epistemic good” whose production unfolds across communities 
and over time, scientific knowledge lends itself to two distinctive garden varieties of epistemic 
injustice. 
Epistemic severing affects narratives about scientific knowledge production that tend to 
surgically excise the contributions of particular epistemic communities. This might happen both 
across communities that might share the same ‘scientific perspective’ (see Massimi 2022; Giere 
2006) and across communities belonging to culturally diverse scientific perspectives. Severing is an 
act of informational injustice in how scientific knowledge production gets narrated in scientific 
textbooks and canons. It should not be confused with the omission or epistemic “blinkering,” as 
one might call it, that inevitably accompanies any scientific narrative, where the narrator can of 
course always choose to foreground some pieces of information and background others depending 
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on their relevance to the narrative and on basis of important ethical considerations too (e.g., Nazi 
science being removed from scientific narratives). 
Epistemic severing is the act of cutting off specific historically and culturally situated 
communities to historically remove or blur their contributions to what I call “historical lineages” 
in the scientific knowledge production. This can be done on various socio-economic-ethnical 
grounds, as when it is epistemically and socially inconvenient for the ruling class to admit the 
contribution to scientific achievements resulting from manual labor of the working class. At the 
receiving end of epistemic severing are often what get referred to as minority communities, where 
“minority” is here understood as synonymous with “under-represented,” communities that on 
various grounds (e.g. class, ethnicity, gender) are not the dominant, ruling, scientific-canon-writing 
ones.  
Epistemic severing can happen in various ways. It can either happen as a wilful act on behalf 
of the narrator to exclude the contribution to scientific knowledge production of under-
represented communities. But it can equally happen in a non-wilful —yet still culpable—way as a 
result of socio-economic structures and epistemic norms that place an emphasis on particular 
modalities of scientific knowledge production over others (e.g. textual rather than oral, codified in 
educational curricula rather than artisanal, universal rather than local knowledge). In the latter case, 
the narrator who fails to acknowledge such contributions, while often unaware of them, would 
still commit an epistemic injustice—one resulting from structural inequities in the way in which 
scientific knowledge production is described and rewarded within particular societies. 
Epistemic severing therefore is not simply failing to “recognize” the contribution of specific 
epistemic communities. It slashes through the very fabric of scientific knowledge production; it 
tears apart the historical interlacing of situated scientific perspectives that is ultimately responsible 
for the growth and evolution of scientific knowledge over time. By severing the historical lineages 
at the junctures where minority communities feature, epistemic severing damages and jeopardizes 
the very possibility of understanding the processes through which scientific knowledge becomes 
possible over time. Failing to do justice to the historical fact that scientific knowledge is indeed the 
outcome of a seamless multicultural web makes it hard to acknowledge ways in which today it 
continues to benefit from interlaced perspectives of minority communities. 
The second variety of epistemic injustice—closely connected with epistemic severing—is 
epistemic trademarking. Epistemic severing is a precondition for epistemic trademarking. Having 
severed the very historical lineages of knowledge production, the next step typically involves the 
appropriation and branding of entire bodies of knowledge claims with associated practices as a 
“trademark” of one particular epistemic community. Epistemic trademarking manifests itself in 
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the fencing, labeling, and ultimately often merchandising of portions of scientific knowledge that 
are the products of myriad interlaced scientific perspectives. 
Epistemic trademarking builds on epistemic severing to further exploit merchandising rights 
arising from scientific knowledge to the exclusive socio-economic benefit of one epistemic 
community at the expense of others. Traditionally, in economic theory and law, trademark 
protection has served two main functions: “the prevention of consumer confusion” and the 
protection against “dilution by blurring” (Sunder 2018, pp. 217 and 219). The first is an argument 
that a market where consumers are not confused about the source and quality of trademarked 
products is more competitive, with more choice, higher-quality goods, and lower prices. The 
second refers to preventing the dilution of the originality and uniqueness of the trademarked 
products through unauthorized reproductions and unmonitored uses.  
By analogy, I see epistemic trademarking operating along these two dimensions. Applying 
an “epistemic trademark” to a piece of scientific knowledge or technological innovation is indeed 
a way of preventing consumer confusion. But it is equally a way of laying claim to merchandising 
rights. And it is a powerful way of ringfencing the uniqueness and originality of a piece of 
knowledge or innovation as if it were the exclusive product of either one agent alone, or one 
particular epistemic community over any other that might have contributed to the process of 
scientific knowledge production, and that—once severed from the historical lineage—loses any 
rights to it. In either case, epistemic trademarking is often the expression of merchandising 
concerns about scientific knowledge qua “epistemic good” that can be commodified and traded 
to a target consumer audience. 
By its very nature, epistemic trademarking harms forms of scientific knowledge that do not 
easily lend themselves to commodification and merchandising: for example, when the knowledge 
is collective rather than individual; oral instead of written; passed on from one generation to the 
next rather than codified in scientific canons and epistemic norms. In what follows, I focus on 
epistemic trademarking and the harm it makes in different epistemic contexts in science. 
 
2. First example of epistemic trademarking: across historically situated epistemic 
communities  
What counts as a mark in science? Consider how even in common parlance scientific outputs 
and achievements are marked with someone’s name: Newton’s laws, Lavoisier’s oxygen, Maxwell’s 
equations, and Boltzmann’s constant are just a few examples from the history of physics. Attaching 
names to a scientific result (be it equations, laws, constants, models, particles, chemical elements, 
etc.) is a way of rightly recognizing authorship and tracing back the original idea to its legitimate 
Michela Massimi,  
PSA 2020 Symposium Science and Justice 
Baltimore, 11 November 2021 
 5 
owner. This is of course a common and uncontroversial practice, and key to copyright laws and 
patent rights (where applicable). Like with epistemic severing/ epistemic blinkering, here too one 
should not confuse epistemic trademarking with the (epistemically innocuous) epistemic 
“labelling”, so to speak, which is ubiquitous in science and does not necessarily presuppose that 
severing has occurred. In other words, it is possible to epistemically “label” without severing. But I 
do not take it to be possible for epistemic trademarking to occur without severing. 
Then the question arises: when does a label or mark become an “epistemic trademark”? The 
transition from an (epistemically innocent) label or mark to an “epistemic trademark” occurs when 
there is an epistemic overstretch of the former to include not just a particular scientific output or 
achievement of someone, who is legitimately recognized as its intellectual owner, but also swaths 
of knowledge claims that for various historically contingent reasons become associated with that 
specific label or mark. 
Consider the following examples: the passage from Newton’s laws to “Newtonian 
mechanics”; or from Maxwell’s equations to “Maxwellian electromagnetic theory”; or from 
Lavoisier’s oxygen to “Lavoisier’s system of chemistry.” The former are marks. The latter are 
epistemic trademarks that designate entire bodies of scientific knowledge claims under the aegis 
of Newton or Maxwell or Lavoisier. Within those bodies of knowledge claims lie particular 
contributions and scientific achievements that predate Newton or Maxwell or Lavosier, 
respectively.  
For example, under Newtonian mechanics one would typically include not just Newton’s 
laws codified in the Principia but more broadly a certain understanding of the mechanical motion 
of bodies as distinct from Aristotelian physics. Such understanding of mechanical motion can be 
traced back via Galileo in 17th-century Pisa and Oresme in 14th-century Paris to medieval scholars 
like Abu Al-Barakāt in Baghdad. While these historical lineages are not lost to the historians of 
science, they can easily get lost outside historical circles as soon as the term “Newtonian 
mechanics” is coined and gains traction in common parlance among scientists and the wider 
public. A mark has become an epistemic trademark.  
Likewise, under “Maxwellian electromagnetic theory” one would typically count not just 
Maxwell’s equations for the electromagnetic field but an entire corpus of knowledge about 
electromagnetic phenomena that begins with Øersted’s experiments in 1820s Denmark and 
continues with Faraday’s experiments in 1830s England, without counting the whole tradition of 
electrical researches with exhausted glass tubes that developed in the mid- to late 19th century and 
was made possible by the manufacture of lead-free glass, produced by professionally trained glass-
blowers, using alkali sources obtained from ashes of burnt seaweed (kelp) and, later, synthetic soda. 
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The specific contribution of each epistemic community—including glass-blowers and kelp-makers 
(see Massimi 2022 and in press)—is lost in the name “Maxwellian electromagnetic theory.” The 
emphasis is placed on the theory rather than on the tools, technological and experimental 
resources, or better the wider scientific perspective (qua historically and culturally situated scientific 
practice) in which the theory was embedded and became possible.  
One might be tempted to brush this observation under a rug as epistemically moot. A label 
is after all just an expedient shorthand to refer to something. The historians know these historical 
lineages, it could be argued, and they can choose to zoom in and out of them depending on the 
focus of their narrative. Scientists and the public, however, do not need to be constantly reminded 
of them in daily discussions and common parlance. 
Yet, I argue, what lies in the label is important. A label or mark in scientific discourse (e.g. 
“Newton’s laws”) becomes an epistemic trademark (e.g. “Newtonian mechanics”) when it ends up 
concealing the complex historical lineages and blurring the epistemic contributions of various 
communities. To be clear, in these examples there is no culpability on the part of individual 
epistemic agents (be it Newton, or Maxwell, or Lavoisier) in the process of transforming a mark 
into an epistemic trademark, for there is no reasonable assumption of a wilful act of severing in 
the agent’s intentions. Instead, epistemic trademarking is here a structural phenomenon of how 
scientific narratives (or a particular kind thereof) get off the ground and tacitly enter public 
discourse as a result of specific epistemic norms that codify scientific knowledge production in 
particular societies.  
It is the perceived need to protect epistemic goods (like the body of knowledge behind 
“Newtonian mechanics” or “Maxwellian electromagnetic theory” or “Lavoisierian chemistry”) 
under a trademark so as to avoid “consumer confusion” with rival products, so to speak. In this 
case, the rival products included Aristotelian physics, which was still lingering in the medieval 
impetus theories of Oresme and Abu Al-Barakāt; the “electromagnetic worldview” associated with 
ether theories; and Joseph Priestley’s “dephlogisticated air” and associated chemistry, respectively. 
Epistemic trademarking is a way of saying “Newtonian mechanics” is really one and the 
same as Newton’s laws as much as “Maxwellian electromagnetic theory” is really one and the same 
as Maxwell’s equations, and this is what one often finds in scientific narratives. The epistemic 
trademark shows its efficacy by branding bodies of knowledge as epistemic goods that can be easily 
recognized and commodified for the use of a particular consumer audience. An indicative example 
is in Richard Feynman’s assessment of Maxwellian electromagnetic theory as reducible to 
Maxwell’s equations: 
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It was not yet customary in Maxwell’s time to think in terms of abstract fields. Maxwell 
discussed his ideas in terms of a model in which the vacuum was like an elastic solid. He 
also tried to explain the meaning of his new equation in terms of the mechanical model. 
There was much reluctance to accept his theory, first because of the model, and second 
because there was at first no experimental justification. Today, we understand better that 
what counts are the equations themselves and not the model used to get them. We may only 
question whether the equations are true or false. This is answered by doing experiments, and 
untold numbers of experiments have confirmed Maxwell’s equations. If we take away the 
scaffolding he used to build it, we find that Maxwell’s beautiful edifice stands on its own. 
He brought together all of the laws of electricity and magnetism and made one complete 
and beautiful theory. (Feynman’s lectures, 18-1 The Maxwell equations, online from: 
https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/II_18.html ) 
 
“Consumer confusion” was removed, and acceptance secured, by trademarking the 
electromagnetic theory—a hodgepodge of ether models and electrical fluid views at the time of 
Maxwell—under the epistemic trademark associated with Maxwell’s equations. The problem is 
that taking away “the scaffolding,” as Feynman put it, amounts to more than simply getting rid of 
an inadequate (and ultimately false) ether model in this particular case. It implies severing the very 
contribution of a number of epistemic communities—not just the ether modelers at the time, like 
FitzGerald and MacCullagh, but experimentalists like Faraday and Ampère, among others—whose 
contributions to our understanding of the laws of electricity and magnetism were pivotal.  
Historical examples of epistemic trademarking abound. However, it would be hasty to 
conclude that this is just a historical phenomenon, or maybe one concerning narratives about 
physics in particular, whose past historiographical tendency to portray science as the product of a 
“lone genius” has done much damage in cutting out entire communities from scientific narratives. 
Epistemic trademarking is very much an ongoing epistemic injustice in science affecting in equal 
measure the biomedical sciences, as the next example shows. 
 
3. Second example of epistemic trademarking: across culturally situated epistemic 
communities  
 
In the biomedical sciences, the commodification of scientific knowledge for merchandising 
purposes relies more than ever on the practice of “epistemic severing” and “epistemic 
trademarking.” At the receiving end, there are ethnic minorities and indigenous communities 
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whose local knowledge—often orally transmitted from one generation to the next—is particularly 
vulnerable to these types of epistemic injustice. Indeed, epistemic trademarking is the very 
epistemic mechanism that structurally underpins the phenomenon known as “biopiracy.” In this 
case, the epistemic trademark finds its tangible incarnation in commercial trademarks that often 
overstretch swaths of knowledge claims contributed by a number of different communities. 
One of the much-quoted examples concerns the use of local knowledge about the rosy 
periwinkle plant in Madagascar. The plant known in botany as Catharantus roseus—and with local 
names such as tonga trongatsy—has long been known in ethnobotany for its medicinal properties. 
Tea made with its leaves in the Philippines was believed to help with diabetes, among other 
conditions. The story goes that Canadian-trained surgeon C.D. Johnston in Jamaica became 
interested in collecting the leaves, drying them, and sending them to Robert Laing Noble, who was 
the Associate Director of the Collip Medical Research Laboratory at the University of Western 
Ontario (see Duffin 2000, on which I draw here). His brother Clark Noble played an important 
role in the discovery of insulin.  
While the hypothesized anti-diabetic properties of the plant had already been refuted in the 
late 1920s, Robert Noble and his team was able to identify other unexpected medical properties. 
His collaborator Charles Beer was able to isolate vinca alkaloids with powerful anti-cancer effects. 
The discovery of vinblastine was announced in 1958 by Noble and Beer and the first clinical trial 
for the anti-cancer drug started in 1959 run by the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly & Co. The 
company earned over $100 million from the production of vincristine and vinblastine, two 
compounds used in anti-cancer drugs. 
Rosy periwinkle continues to be harvested, dried, and collected today in southern regions of 
Madagascar where the highest-quality vinca alkaloids can be found. Local rural Malagasy 
communities continue to provide labor for large international corporations.  Recent studies (e.g. 
Neimark 2012) have remarked how despite international protocols such as access and benefit 
sharing (ABS) and the Convention on Biological Diversity, very few socio-economic benefits 
trickle down to the local Malagasy community. By and large, the community continues to rely on 
traditional methods for harvesting, drying, and transporting (often for long distances and on foot) 
the dried plants to central facilities where subsidiaries for multinational companies collect them 
for international transport. Often such tasks fall on older women in the Malagasy community, who 
can pick periwinkle in the wild and carry “up to 5 to 10kg per trip. … Some buyers estimate that 
close to half of all root bundles are brought to market by older women” (ibid., p. 436). 
Malagasy periwinkle producers continue to be at the receiving end of the commodification 
of scientific knowledge that I call “epistemic trademarking.” This case, among others (including 
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neem trees in India used for toiletries and insecticides or the African katempfe plant for a calorie-
free sweetener—see Ostergard et al. 2001), has raised questions about how local knowledge of 
biodiversity, for example, can be subject to intellectual property laws.   
Some have remarked how the current WTO system of Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) ends up protecting the interest of multinational corporations at the 
expense of communities who, despite providing the local knowledge, often “are among the least 
likely to benefit from the resulting drugs, much less even hear about them or reap any monetary 
benefits at all” (Jiang 2008, pp. 30–31).  
Legal scholars have been considering alternative options such as benefit-sharing agreements 
that Western companies must sign when using the National Cancer Institute’s Natural Product 
Collection, whose biodiverse materials mostly come from the Global South (Jiang 2008, p. 32). In 
other cases, like the deal between Merk & Co. and Costa Rica’s National Institute of Biodiversity 
(INBio), compensation takes the form of shares in royalties (“undisclosed” and “thought to be 
between 1% and 3%”) for the development of new drugs using indigenous plant and animal 
extracts while retaining patent rights for the corporation (Stone 1992, p. 1624).  
Tools for legally protecting indigenous knowledge—such as the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the Nagoya 
Protocol in 2010—have so far aimed to facilitate “access and benefit sharing (ABS) mechanisms” 
and biopiracy is now recognized as a “serious violation of indigenous peoples” rights’ (see UN 
2014, p. 2).  
Yet the normative-legal force of the CBD and Nagoya Protocol remains at the mercy of 
individual nation-states, whose sole sovereignty on the public land, its biodiverse materials, and 
local knowledge means that local people’s rights are ultimately still dependent upon nation-states’ 
decisions.  
On November 21, 2019, the UN General Assembly in its “Implementation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Contribution to Sustainable Development” (UN 2019) 
reiterated the 2050 Vision for Biodiversity in engaging indigenous people and local communities 
(art. 8 (d)); lamented “the limited progress made by its parties in the implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol” (art. 25); and stressed “the importance of the engagement of the private sector and 
relevant stakeholders, as well as indigenous people and local communities, women and youth,” in 
the implementation of the Convention (art. 40).  
Behind the battle for recognizing intellectual property rights to varieties of local knowledge, 
there are huge economic interests. But this debate is also eye-opening for philosophical discussions 
about the nature of scientific knowledge: who produces scientific knowledge, and who gets to benefit 
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from it. Epistemic severing cuts off the interlacing of scientific perspectives upon which scientific 
knowledge historically grows and evolves. Epistemic trademarking applies the trademark to well-
defined portions or fragments of this vast and open-ended interlacing in order to advance 
merchandising rights.  
 
4. Conclusion. What remedies for epistemic trademarking?  
 
Epistemic trademarking as an epistemic injustice associated with scientific knowledge 
production calls for more than ABS as a legal tool for sharing benefits with the source countries 
and communities, whose local knowledge about the methods and practices for harvesting 
biodiverse materials proves commercially lucrative. Epistemic trademarking can only be remedied 
by re-instating intellectual ownership of the relevant knowledge to local communities. In other words, 
it is important to distinguish between the harm that epistemic trademarking does from that caused 
by the commercial practice of appropriating and merchandising local botanical knowledge, for 
example.  
Even in the best case scenarios where fair ABS mechanisms are in place, credit to the origin 
of the biodiverse material is given, and dividends are paid back to local communities, there would 
still be epistemic injustice. There would still be “epistemic severing” if the story that gets narrated 
is the story of progress in biomedical innovations where local knowledge is marginalized and 
downgraded to a mere repository of traditional wisdom, in the words of the legal scholar Madhavi 
Sunder 
 
presenting poor people’s knowledge as the raw material of innovation—ancient, static, and 
natural—rather than as intellectual property—modern, dynamic, scientific, and cultural invention. 
Under this view, traditional knowledge holders may receive remuneration for conserving 
biodiversity and contributing the raw materials of innovation, but they are not recognized 
as intellectual property holders in their own right. (Sunder 2007, pp. 100–101, emphases in 
original) 
 
Moreover, there would still be “epistemic trademarking” in the seamless process of knowledge 
production—from the original identification of the relevant phenomena (e.g. particular suspected 
medicinal effects of some plants) to the subsequent refinement of the associated knowledge claims 
via a variety of practices and methods until the new drug is produced. In a society whose epistemic 
norms codify scientific knowledge as written knowledge produced via experimental methods, the 
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oral knowledge of local communities without the financial-technological resources to satisfy these 
epistemic norms is bound to be severed and left at the periphery rather than being celebrated in 
the co-production of knowledge. Worse, it becomes easy to exploit.  
To conclude, understanding the epistemic structural mechanism behind biopiracy implies 
grasping the deeper source of widespread epistemic injustices in science. Biopiracy is only one 
manifestation, glaring as is with its merchandising implications, of a wider and more subtle variety 
of epistemic injustice affecting scientific knowledge production and narratives thereof. 
Redistribution remedies by themselves (in the form of ABS or similar) are not sufficient. For the 
problem is not so much or only about “giving back” scientific knowledge, or not restricting access 
to it. The bigger substantive problem is how to “reclaim” as one’s own portions of knowledge that 
have been appropriated, re-used, and eventually “trademarked” by others. Philosophers of science 
have a responsibility to analyze the mechanisms behind such epistemic injustices.  
The dynamic, fluid, open-ended, inferential nature of scientific knowledge as I have 
described it in my monograph (Massimi 2022)—a spectacular product of myriad interlacing 
perspectives—does not lend itself to the logic of severing and trademarking. It undercuts precisely 
the dichotomy that Sunder highlights as a barrier to the legal protection of local communities’ 
knowledge. A phenomena-first ontology like the one I advocate undercuts any argument designed 
to ghettoize local knowledge and downgrade it to wisdom about “raw materials.”  
There is more. The perspectival pluralism that I see as compatible with realism makes 
trademarking an epistemic injustice before it even qualifies as a socio-economic injustice in the 
dress of biopiracy. For epistemic trademarking undercuts the situatedness of scientific knowledge; 
it breaks down historical lineages. Perspectival realism offers a philosophical framework (surely 
not the only possible one) for understanding scientific knowledge production that is stridently at 
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